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AbstrAct: The criminal law standard of Beyond A Reasonable Doubt (BARD) 
constitutes an evidentiary and judicial rule, formulated and applied for 
centuries in common law jurisdictions, which was expressly stated in 
the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure only about fifteen years ago. 
Unfortunately, the concept of reasonable doubt is inherently complex 
and does not easily lend itself to definition or refinement. In this regard, 
the Author examines especially the various positions and elaborations 
developed by legal literature and case-law in Italy, proposing a specific 
interpretation of the BARD rule that enhances and completes the 
particular procedural connotations of the adversarial system adopted 
in the Italian criminal justice.
Keywords: reasonable doubt; criminal procedure; presumption of 
innocence; burden of proof; standard of proof; judicial reasoning 
method; fair trial.
resumo: O standard penal do Beyond A Reasonable Doubt (BARD) constitui 
uma regra de prova e de juízo, formulada e aplicada durante séculos em jurisdi-
ções de common law, que foi expressamente introduzida no Código de Processo 
Penal italiano apenas cerca de quinze anos atrás. Infelizmente, o conceito de 
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dúvida razoável é inerentemente complexo e não se presta facilmente a 
uma definição ou a uma melhor delimitação. Diante disso, o autor examina 
sobretudo as diferentes posições e elaborações desenvolvidas pela doutrina 
e pela jurisprudência na Itália, oferecendo uma interpretação específica da 
regra BARD que valoriza e completa as conotações processuais particulares 
do sistema acusatório adotado na justiça penal italiana.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: dúvida razoável; processo penal; presunção de inocência; 
ônus da prova; standard de prova; método de raciocínio judicial; justo 
processo.
tAble of contents: 1. Establishing Criminal Liability Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt: Introduction. - 2. The Italian Codification of a 
Common Law Legal Formula. - 3. “Beyond any Reasonable Doubt” 
as Evidentiary and Judicial Rule in the Italian Criminal Trial. - 
4. Conclusion.
1. Establishing Criminal liability Beyond a ReasonaBle douBt: 
introduCtion.
The judgment criterion of the “Beyond A Reasonable Doubt” 
(BARD) rule has a direct impact on the forceful reasons protecting both 
personal freedom and innocence, which for centuries have been a core 
subject of reflection on the establishment of the criminal liability in 
Western legal culture, and in particular in Anglo-American law tradition2. 
However, it is to be noted that currently in Italy there is a renewed 
2 For a thorough historical reconstruction of the BARD, see LANGBEIN, John 
H. The Ori gins of Adversary Criminal Trial. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p. 261 f.; SHAPIRO, Barbara J. “Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt”  and “Probable Cause”. Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-Ameri-
can Law of Evidence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, passim; 
SHEPPARD, Steve. The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes 
in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence. Notre 
Dame Law Rev., 2003, p. 1166 f.; WALDMAN, Theodore. Origins of the legal 
doctrine of reasonable doubt. Journal of the History of Ideas, 1959, p. 299 f.; 
WHITMAN, James Q. The origins of reasonable doubt. Theological roots of the 
criminal trial. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, passim.
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attention within legal literature and case-law towards this principle, 
due to the legislative reform of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 
(hereinafter CCP). 
In the point of fact, the Italian Law No. 46, February 20, 2006, by 
amending Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP, has explicitly stated that the Judge renders a 
decision against the defendant in the criminal proceedings «if the accused 
is found guilty of the alleged offence beyond any reasonable doubt». Hence, 
the Italian legislator has explicitly and solemnly included in the criminal 
procedure code the judgment criterion of “beyond any reasonable doubt” 
as a negative condition of the conviction against the accused.
In particular, from a logical-textual point of view, in the Italian 
codicistic discipline the BARD rule is formulated in a “negative” way 
(i.e. paying attention to the evidentiary situation that legitimizes the 
condemnation of the accused) and not in a “positive” way (that is to 
say in the perspective of the evidence that determines the acquittal), 
because – according to the traditional distribution of the onus probandi in 
the criminal proceeding – it is up to the prosecution to bring such evidence 
as to eliminate any reasonable doubt about the guilt of a defendant, who 
is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proven.
Nevertheless, to the present day the evaluative criterion to establish 
criminal liability “beyond a reasonable doubt” is still generally characterized 
by substantial ambiguity and conceptual vagueness. Unfortunately, the 
concept of reasonable doubt is inherently complex and does not easily 
lend itself to definition or refinement. Therefore, in over fifteen years, 
in Italy the legislative introduction has not prevented a recurrence of 
different interpretations that mutually rebut each other in a fervid debate.
Precisely in this regard, this essay – through a careful analysis of 
various positions and elaborations developed in Italy by legal literature 
and case-law – aims to highlight that, in Italian criminal proceedings, the 
probatory and judgment criterion of reasonable doubt, without being 
reduced only to the subjective extent of judicial belief, is called to constitute 
(in implementation of the fundamental principle of favor innocentiae) a 
spe cific legal method of parties’ evidentiary argumentation, of judge’s 
conviction and, correlatively, of decision’s rational justification. In this 
perspective, therefore, the reconstructive key of the reasonable doubt 
concept, far from postulating the need for the establishment of a static 
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and abstract evidentiary standard, is based on the identification of a 
methodological path – capable of providing prescriptive modalities for the 
concrete formation of the judge’s conviction – to be pursued to reach that 
threshold of legal certainty necessary to justify the accused’s condemnation.
2. thE italian CodifiCation of a Common law lEgal formula.
In some common law countries, such as the United States of 
America, the evidentiary and judgment rule of the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” has represented for centuries a real source of pride of their 
democracies, as well as the cornerstone of their criminal justice.
Under careful reflection, it appears to be almost impossible to 
relocate without due care and necessary adjustments the BARD formula – 
arisen and developed at the heart of common law, through a centuries-old 
elaboration both of legal literature3 and of case-law4 – to civil law trial 
3 For an analysis of this regulatory scheme in the common law legal literature, 
see, in particular, ALLEN, Jessie. Blind Faith and Reasonable Doubts: Inves-
tigating Beliefs in the Rule of Law. Seattle Univ. Law Rev., 2001, p. 691 f.; 
CLARK, Sherman J. The Juror, the Citizen, and the Human Being: The Pre-
sumption of Innocence and the Burden of Judgment. Crim. Law and Philos., 
2014, p. 421 f.; LAUDAN, Larry. Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?. Legal Theo-
ry, 2003, 9, p. 295 f.; LAUDAN, Larry. Truth, Error, and Criminal Law. An Essay 
in Legal Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 32 f.; 
LILLQUIST, Erik. Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Vir-
tues of Variabi lity. U.C. Davis Law Rev., 2002, p. 86 f.; LIPPKE, Richard L. The 
Prosecutor and the Presumption of Innocence. Crim. Law and Philos., 2014, p. 
337 f.; MINHAS, Azhar J. Proof Beyond any reasonable doubt: Shifting Sands 
of a Bedrock. Northern Illinois Univ. Law Rev., 2003, p. 46 f.; NEWMAN, John 
O. Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”. New York Univ. Law Rev., 1993, p. 984 f.; RA-
MADAN, Hisham M. Reconstructing Reasonable ness in Criminal Law: Mod-
erate Jury Instruction Proposal. Journal of legislation, 2003, p. 233 f.; RAMA-
DAN, Hisham M., The Challenge of Explai ning “Reasonable Doubt”. Criminal 
Law Bulletin, 2004, p. 65 f.; ROBERTS, Paul; ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal 
Evidence, II ed., Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 366 
f.; STEIN, Alex. Foundations of Evidence Law. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, p. 172 f.; WRIGHT, Richard W. Causation, Responsi-
bility, Risk, Proba bility, Naked Statistics and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush 
by Clarifying the Concepts. Iowa Law Rev., 1988, p. 1002. 
4 In particular, regarding the exact content of the numerous case-law decisions 
that in the United States have succeeded one another and have faced this 
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systems, where the administration of criminal justice is based on the 
formulation of reasoned decisions with grounds stated by professional 
Judges, and not on groundless verdicts issued by juries.
In truth, whereas a judicial system based on a jury poses the 
crucial problem of ensuring that a fair state of mind of the jurors, an 
“abiding conviction” on the criminal liability of the accused, is reached, 
in the Italian criminal procedural law the pure and simple personal belief 
of the Judge is irrelevant. What matters is the rational acceptability of 
the decision, as expressed in the pars motiva of the judgement5.
vexata quaestio, it is possible to ideally surmise an essential distinction: on 
the one hand, there are those judgments focusing on highlighting the ethical 
and political values expressed by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” rule [(In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Victor v. Nebraska, 512 U.S. 1 (1994); Foucha 
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1992); 
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)]; on the other hand, there are con-
spicuously more important, diversified, and complex judgments that also aim 
at identifying the conceptual entity and the material elements of the heuristic 
formula of BARD [McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 75, 657 P.2d 1157, (1983); 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 257 (1993); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 
(1999); Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 984 (1984); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 
(1990); The people of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, No. 
Ba097211 (1995); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 234 (1998); 
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)].
5 Indeed, in judicial systems with a common law jury the fundamental point is 
to safeguard that a correct mental state of the judging body is formed, while 
the cognitive process culminating in the verdict cannot be really verified. On 
the contrary, in many continental Europe countries, such as Italy, the judicial 
system, foremost, requires that the judge demonstrate that he has not let him-
self be overcome by prevention and sentiment, as well as that he has not let 
himself be carried away by impulse and uncontrolled intuition. Furthermore, 
this kind of jurisdictional system wants the judge to demonstrate how he 
reached his conviction and the evidence used in the argumentative proce-
dure, so explaining in the judgment motivation the logical process followed 
and how evidentiary elements were assessed with a positive or negative val-
ue. In this regard, see JONAKAIT, Randolph N. The American Jury System. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, p. 2 f.; LANGBEIN, 
John H. op. cit., p. 321 f.; NAJDOWSKI, Cynthia J.; STEVENSON, Margaret 
C. (ed.). Criminal juries in the 21st century. Contemporary issues, psychological 
science, and the law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 19 f.; VID-
MAR, Neil (ed.). World Jury Systems. Oxford and New York: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2000, p. 23 f.
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By way of explanation, in common law trial systems, while it is 
not possible to assess the cognitive process resulting in the verdict, the 
type of information provided to the jury is easy to control. Conversely, 
within the Italian criminal justice system, the Judge’s task must be 
transferred in a precise and cogent legal ground for the taken decision. 
As a matter of fact, in light of the legislative provision, the judgment 
must be first and foremost expressed «specifying the reached results and 
the adopted criteria in the grounds of the judgment» (Art. 192, ph. 1, 
CCP). Furthermore, even after the recent approval of the Law No. 103, 
June 23, 2017, the reasons adduced for a judgment must be necessarily 
stated in a binary structure in which concisely the evidence fundamental 
for the decision and the «explanations on why the evidence in rebuttal 
are deemed to be unreliable» (with particular regard to some points 
expressly specified ex lege) are both indicated (Art. 546, ph. 1, Lett. 
E, CCP). The aim of all this is to legitimize, in a thorough manner, the 
judicial compliance with a determined historical reconstruction and the 
rebuttal of opposing hypotheses6. 
Certainly, the meaning of “reasonable doubt” as codified in the 
California Penal Code7 and mentioned in the California Criminal Jury 
6 In this regard, see CERESA-GASTALDO, Massimo. Nuovi (discutibili) profili 
dell’inammissibilità delle impugnazioni. In: BARGIS, Marta; BELLUTA Hervé 
(ed.). La riforma delle impugnazioni tra carenze sistematiche e incertezze appli-
cative (Commento alla legge 23 giugno 2017, n. 103 e al d.lgs. 6 febbraio 2018, 
n. 11). Torino: Giappichelli, 2018, p. 11 f.; CAPONE, Arturo. La motivazione 
della sentenza. In: GIULIANI, Livia; ORLANDI, RENZO (ed.). Indagini pre-
liminari e giudizio di primo grado. Commento alla legge 23 giugno 2017, n. 103. 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2018, p. 297 f.; DELLA MONICA, Giuseppe. Contribu-
to allo studio della motivazione. Padova: Cedam, 2002, p. 98 f.; IACOVIELLO, 
Francesco Mauro. La motivazione della sentenza penale e il suo controllo in cas-
sazione. Milano: Giuffrè, 1997, p. 226 f.; IACOVIELLO, Francesco Mauro, Lo 
standard probatorio dell’al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio e il suo controllo 
in cassazione. Cassazione Penale, 2006, p. 3874; MENNA, Mariano. La mo-
tivazione del giudizio penale. Napoli: Jovene, 2000, p. 61 f.
7 Of course, a definition of reasonable doubt, representing a cornerstone of the 
conceptual evaluation in common law, is reached in the California Penal Code 
Section 1096: «it is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to 
human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of 
the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evi-
dence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they 
feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge».
1233
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 2, p. 1227-1260, mai.-ago. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i2.577 |
Instructions has the absolute merit of binding, concretely and indissolubly, 
the «abiding conviction» with the «entire comparison and consideration of 
all the evidence». Nevertheless, it is not easy to contest that «considering all 
the evidence and weighing it in an appropriate way are very distinct things»8. 
This formula atones also for its shortcoming of focus on the subjective 
state of the juror, suggesting very little about the kind of evidence necessary 
for conviction, but above all ignoring the process of reasoning trough the 
evidence altogether. 
After all, this might be one of the salient points leading today 
towards an increasingly open discussion about the BARD “failure” in the 
common law experience9. In other words, the problem lies not so much 
in the undeniable hurdle of understanding and formalizing a notion 
of “reasonable doubt” that overcomes the objective ambiguity and the 
succinctness of this linguistic and conceptual formula10, but rather in 
8 LAUDAN, Larry. Is Reasonable doubt Reasonable?, loc. cit., p. 305. 
9 Laudan expressly states, categorically and from different points of view, that 
«BARD is failing», so much so that he efficaciously concludes the following: 
«BARD’s day has come and gone» (Truth, Error, and Criminal Law. An Essay in 
Legal Epistemology, loc. cit., p. 51 and 62). For a coherent critique of Laudan’s 
speculative position in subiecta materia, see STELLA, Federico; GALAVOT-
TI, Maria Carla. «L’oltre il ragionevole dubbio» come standard probatorio. 
Le infondate divagazioni dell’epistemologo Laudan. Rivista italiana di diritto e 
procedura penale, 2005, p. 883 f.
10 It is interesting to note that a particular interpretation claims the concept of 
“reasonable doubt” to be self-evident or self-defining, and, therefore, already 
existing in the minds of the jurors. It is, hence, maintained that a prior defini-
tion, provided in the jury instructions, explaining the level of proof necessary 
to consider an accused guilty of a specific crime, is superfluous, or even in-
opportune and harmful: «“reasonable doubt” must speak for itself. Jurors know 
what is “reasonable” and are quite familiar with the meaning of “doubt” Judges’ 
and lawyers’ at tempts to inject other amorphous catch-phrases into the “reason-
able doubt” standard, such as “matter of the highest importance”, only muddy 
the water. It is, therefore, inappropriate for judges to give an instruction defining 
“reason able doubt”, and fit is equally inappropriate for trial counsel to provide 
their own definition» (U.S. v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 1988). On closer inspection, 
nevertheless, this stand seems to be justified by the objective difficulty in for-
malizing a notion of this concept that could be largely embraced, rather than 
by the real existence of an immediate and general notion of a univocal mean-
ing of the saying “reasonable doubt”. In truth, it was noted that «the term “be-
yond a reasonable doubt” may be in common usage by the pop ulace of this nation, 
but there is no demonstrable or reliable evidence that a reasonably appropriate 
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the – more or less – obstinacy of legal practice and theory that keep on 
defining it in terms of target mental state of the jurors, thus leaving in 
a cryptic perspective the epistemic relevance of adversarial principle, 
probatory inferences, the assessment of alternative hypotheses, and 
the connections between evidence and final decision, hence, the whole 
dynamic aspect of the cognitive material operation11. On the other hand, 
the idea according to which «it is not essential that a juror be able to give 
“some proper reason for entertaining it”; it may exist without his being able 
to formulate any reason for it»12 – typical of the common law tradition – 
appears to be intrinsically structured in a judicial system based on a verdict 
lacking the obligation to state grounds for it. In so reasoning, however, it 
is unchallengeable that «if a juror’s doubt cannot be expressed, we cannot 
parse it along the axis that separates the rational from the irrational»13. 
Therefore, an effective and adequate reconstruction of the formula 
transplanted from the common law tradition to the criminal procedure 
code in force will have to confront the distinctive features of the Italian 
legal experience, in which this procedural institution – far from coming 
to a decision only according to the subjective measure of the Judge’s 
belief – is basically held liable for the creation of a legal method for the 
parties’ argumentations, the cognition of the judicial body, and the rational 
explanation on the adopted decisions. When facing the codification of 
definition is in common usage or well understood by prospective citizen jurors» 
(Concurring opinion by Anderson, in U.S. v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608, 612, 9th Cir. 
1981). Furthermore, it should be noted that in the English system, where 
the criterion of beyond a reasonable doubt was coined, is currently practice to 
avoid explanations and clarifications on the material content of this rule, as 
such practice is deemed to negatively influence the juries.
11 It is no coincidence that LAUDAN, Larry. Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 
loc. cit., p. 305, in relation to the centuries-old and invincible «fundamental 
conceptual confusion» on BARD and on the consequential problematic nature 
of its applicability, expressively recalls the importance to focus this rule on 
the proofs necessary to justify a well-founded belief, stating also that «instead of 
instructing jurors as to what mental state they should have in order to vote to con-
vict, courts would do better to inform jurors in a general way about the epistemic 
or logical features that a case must exhibit before it can properly be regarded as 
putting the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt». 
12 Pennsylvania v. Dauphinee, 121 Pa. Super. 565, 590 (1936). 
13 LAUDAN, Larry. Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, loc. cit., p. 308. 
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the probatory and judgment criterion characterizing the Anglo-American 
world, legal professionals have to deal with the impact of this innovation 
in the Italian justice system, as well as especially acknowledging, steering, 
and developing the strong correlation established between the “beyond 
any reasonable doubt” criterion and the dynamic structures of the 
criminal procedure adopted in Italy, where the burden of proof borne 
by the prosecution adds up to the obligation to state grounds for the 
judicial decisions14. 
In the wake of the 2006 reform, a position emerged in the legal 
literature, aiming at minimizing the real enlightening significance of 
this new regulation15 by supporting the nature of acknowledgement 
14 On the merits, it is interesting to notice that, according to the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court, if on the one hand the Rome Statute 
establishes that, «in order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of 
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt» (Art. 66, ph. 3, SCPI), on the 
other hand, it provides that «the decision shall be in writing and shall contain 
a full and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber’s findings on the evidence 
and conclusions» (Art. 74, ph. 5, SCPI). In this regard, in particular, see FAN-
CHIOTTI, Vittorio. Il giudizio. In: LATTANZI, Giorgio; MONETTI, Vito (ed.). 
La Corte penale internazionale. Organi - Competenza - Reati - Processo. Milano: 
Giuffrè, 2006, p. 1221 f.; FANCHIOTTI, Vittorio; MIRAGLIA, Michela; PIER-
INI, Jean Paul. La Corte penale internazionale. Profili sostanziali e processuali. 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2014; SCHABAS, William A. The International Criminal 
Court. A Commentary on the Rome Statute, II ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, p. 1635 f.; VAGIAS, Michail; FERENCZ, Janos. Burden and Stan-
dard of Proof in Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the International Crim-
inal Court. Leiden Journal of International Law, 2015, 28, 1, p. 133 f.
15 For an interpretation towards a mitigation of the innovative scope of the 
reform, see F. D’ALESSANDRO, L’oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio nella valu-
tazione del nesso causale e della colpa: passi avanti della più recente giuris-
prudenza di merito e di legittimità. Cassazione penale, 2006, p. 2406; V. GA-
ROFOLI, I nuovi standards valutativi e gli epiloghi decisori nel giudizio. In: A. 
GAITO (ed.). La nuova disciplina delle impugnazioni dopo la “legge Pecorella”. 
Torino: Utet, 2006, p. 77 f.; G. ILLUMINATI, Giudizio. In: CONSO, Giovanni; 
GREVI, Vittorio; BARGIS, Marta. Compendio di procedura penale, IX ed., (Pa-
dova: Cedam, 2018, p. 882; LOZZI, Gilberto. Lezioni di procedura penale, XIV 
ed., Torino: Giappichelli, 2020, p. 599; PAPAGNO, Claudio. L’interpretazione 
del giudice penale tra regole probatorie e regole decisorie. Milano: Giuffrè, 2009, 
p. 349; PERCHINUNNO, Vincenzo. La fase del giudizio. In: PISANI, Mario; 
MOLARI, Alfredo; PERCHINUNNO, Vincenzo; CORSO, Piermaria; DOMIN-
IONI, Oreste; GAITO, Alfredo; SPANGHER, Giorgio. Manuale di procedura 
penale, VIII ed., Bologna: Monduzzi, 2008, p. 508; PISANI, Mario. Riflessioni 
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of a judgment rule already existing in the criminal justice system and, 
most of all, highlighting its abstract and programmatic nature for being 
a mere “token law”16.
It was stated that BARD was already an immanent rule in the 
Italian procedural law, as it naturally accompanies the basic principle of 
the presumption of innocence17. Art. 27, ph. 2 of the Italian Constitution 
(as well as by the more “precise” provision set forth in Art. 6, ph. 2, 
ECHR18), in particular, already provided the grounds for this guarantee 
criterion by considering that the persistence of any reasonable doubt on 
the defendant’s responsibility could never have allowed surmounting 
the obstacles of such guarantee. In support of the preexistence of the 
principle introduced by the 2006 reform of Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP in the 
Italian legal order, it has been especially emphasized that the codification 
of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” rule appears to be quite redundant, 
sul tema del “ragionevole dubbio”. Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura pe-
nale, 2007, p. 1253 f.; TRIGGIANI, Nicola. Lo standard dimostrativo nella 
decisione di colpevolezza. In: INCAMPO, Antonio; SCALFATI, Adolfo (ed.). 
Giudizio penale e ragionevole dubbio. Bari: Cacucci, 2017, p. 327 f.; UBERTIS, 
Giulio. Fatto, prova e verità (alla luce del principio dell’oltre ogni ragionevole 
dubbio). Criminalia, 2009, p. 327.
16 On this point, CORDERO, Franco. Procedura penale, VIII ed., Milano: Giuf-
frè, 2006, p. 1001, spoke in a critical way about a “banal Americanism” and 
“obvious truth”, considering the coded formula to be downright emphatic 
and unrealistic.
17 On the same conclusion, see CAPRIOLI, Francesco. item “Condanna” (dir-
itto processuale penale), in Enciclopedia del diritto, Ann. II, tome I, 2008, p. 
103; FERRUA, Paolo. Il giudizio penale: fatto e valore giuridico. In: FERRUA, 
Paolo; GRIFANTINI, Fabio M.; ILLUMINATI, Giulio; ORLANDI, Renzo. 
La prova nel dibattimento penale, IV ed., Torino: Giappichelli, 2010, p. 381; 
KOSTORIS, Roberto E. item “Giudizio” (diritto processuale penale), in Enci-
clopedia giuridica Treccani, vol. XV, 1997, p. 9 f.; KOSTORIS, Roberto E. Le 
modifiche al codice di procedura penale in tema di ap pello e di ricorso per 
cassazione introdotte dalla cd. “legge Pecorella”. Rivista diritto processuale, 
2006, p. 642; PAULESU, Pier Paolo. item “Presunzione di non colpevolezza”, in 
Digesto penale, vol. IX, 1995, p. 694. 
18 On the same subject, see in particular CHIAVARIO, Mario. Sub Art. 6. In: 
BARTOLE, Sergio; CONFORTI, Benedetto; RAIMONDI, Guido (ed.). Com-
mentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle lib-
ertà fondamentali. Padova: Cedam, 2001, p. 153, and APRILE, Ercole. Diritto 
processuale penale europeo e internazionale. Padova: Cedam, 2007, p. 185 f.
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since it was already stated in Art. 530, ph. 2, CCP, which expressively 
imposes the acquittal of the defendant, should the evidence be insufficient 
or contradictory19. 
The trend in denying a true innovative value of the terms 
expressed in Art. 533 of the CCP could initially be found also in case-
law. The first judgments of the Supreme Court after the entry into force 
of Law No. 46/2006 have acknowledged a mere descriptive nature of the 
legislative formula and maintained that the “reasonable doubt” on the 
guilt of the accused would already have entailed the acquittal pursuant to 
Art. 530, ph. 2, CCP20. The Court of Cassation has also pointed out that 
the legislator – by introducing the principle according to which a Judge 
renders an adverse decision only if the accused is found to be «guilty of 
the alleged crime beyond any reasonable doubt» – did not intend to decree 
a different and stricter criterion to evaluate the evidence21, insofar as 
Law No. 46/2006 has simply formalized a rule that was already absorbed 
by the case-law, and according to which a conviction is possible only if 
during the proceedings emerges the certitude of the defendant’s liability22.
19 In particular, see DIDONE, Antonio. La c.d. “Legge Pecorella” e i giudizi pen-
denti in cassazione: prime riflessioni. Cassazione penale, 2006, p. 391.
20 Court of Cassation, I Division, June 28, 2006, Volpon, in Electronic Documen-
tation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 234374; Court of Cassation, II 
Division, April 21, 2006, Serino, ib., No. 233785; in compliance with Court of 
Cassation, II Division, November 9, 2012, in Rivista italiana di diritto e proce-
dura penale, 2014, p. 361.
21 For the reasons that pushed the Italian legislator to code the judgment rule 
of the “beyond any reasonable doubt”, see CATALANO, Elena Maria. Ragion-
evole dubbio e logica della decisione. Alle radici del giusnaturalismo processuale. 
Milano: Giuffrè, 2016, p. 43 f.; CONTI, Carlotta. Al di là del ragionevole dub-
bio. In: SCALFATI, Adolfo (ed.). Novità su impugnazioni penali e regole di giu-
dizio. Legge 20 febbraio 2006, n. 46, “legge Pecorella”. Milano: Ipsoa, 2006, p. 
87; DALIA, Gaspare. Convincimento giudiziale e ragionevole dubbio. Milano: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 7 f.; MARZADURI, Enrico. Sub Art. 5 l. 20 febbraio 
2006 n. 46. Legislazione penale, 2007, p. 88 f.; RUGGIERI, Francesca. Beyond 
any reasonable doubt: una matrice di common law. In: INCAMPO, Antonio; 
SCALFATI, Adolfo (ed.). Giudizio penale e ragionevole dubbio, loc. cit., p. 307 f.
22 Court of Cassation, I Division, May 11, 2006, Ganci, in Electronic Documenta-
tion Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 234111. Indeed, in many judgments 
of the Supreme Court, rendered when the original formulation of Art. 533 
was still into force, it is possible to come upon more or less explicit refer-
ences to the “reasonable doubt” rule defined as criterion, as can be gathered 
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A different interpretation soon emerged within the complex 
debate on the real effects of the reform of Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP, aiming 
at representing the codification of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” 
principle if not as some sort of “Copernican revolution” in the trial 
assessment of the facts and of the criminal liability23, at least as a regulatory 
corroboration – according to the perspective of the completion of the 
adversarial procedure24 and strengthening of the guarantees provided by 
a “fair trial” – of a specific epistemological statute. 
Although admitting that the prove on the “reasonableness” 
of the doubt can rely on complicated judgments of value25, the idea 
of reducing this essential characteristic to a mere issue of personality 
that expresses generically the outcome of a judgment balancing the 
from Art. 530, ph. 2, CCP, pursuant to which, should the evidence of guilt be 
insufficient or contradictory, the accused must be acquitted. To this end, see 
Court of Cassation, IV Division, January 23, 2002, Orlando, in Rivista penale, 
2002, p. 671 f.; Court of Cassation, IV Division, September 25, 2001, Covili, 
in Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2002, p. 737 f. On the other 
hand, when the repealed code of procedure was still into force, it was possi-
ble to understand the idée en germe of this rule of judgment in some rare de-
cisions of the Court of Cassation (Court of Cassation, I Division, July 1, 1987, 
Ingemi, in Cassazione penale, 1998, p. 1845; Court of Cassation, I Division, 
May 4, 1987, Lombardi, in Rivista penale, 1988, p. 512; Court of Cassation, I 
Division, April 27, 1987, Mazzotta, in Cassazione penale, 1988, p. 1699; Court 
of Cassation, V Division, December 12, 1975, Giannetta, in Electronic Docu-
mentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 133816). 
23 See PALIERO, Carlo Enrico. Il «ragionevole dubbio» diventa criterio, Guida al 
diritto, 2006, 10, p. 73; in the same vein, see PIERGALLINI, Carlo. La regola 
dell’“oltre ragionevole dubbio” al banco di prova di un ordinamento di civil 
law. Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2007, p. 593 f.
24 For the codification of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” criterion as ad-
justment measure of the Italian trial system to the standard of the adversarial 
model, see CARLIZZI, Gaetano. Libero convincimento e ragionevole dubbio nel 
processo penale. San Lazzaro di Savena: Bonomo, 2018, p. 10 f.; GUALTIERI, 
Piero. Diritto di difesa e prova scientifica. Diritto penale e processo, 2011, p. 
494; LORUSSO, Sergio. La regola del “ragionevole dubbio” e la riforma delle 
impugnazioni. In: GAROFOLI, Vincenzo (ed.). La sentenza della corte costituz-
ionale 6 febbraio 2007, n. 26: un energico richiamo al metodo della giurisdizione, 
Atti del Convegno, Trani, 2-3 febbraio 2007. Milano: Giuffrè, 2007, p. 95. 
25 See FERRUA, Paolo. La colpevolezza oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio. In: FILIP-
PI, Leonardo (ed.). Il nuovo regime delle impugnazioni tra Corte costituzionale 
e Sezioni unite. Padova: Cedam, 2007, p. 144.
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blatancy of the inculpating evidence and the abstract admissibility of 
the doubt does not seem to be shareable. The logical characteristic of 
“reasonableness” provides the doubt with the tangible and objective 
practicality nature avoiding that the outcome of the trial rests upon 
discretionary appreciations verging on a mere personal choice26. 
Any nihilistic tendency to a skepticism portraying the 
“reasonableness” as an intrinsically indeterminate and fatally impossible to 
be determinate concept must be warden off, together with the approximate 
idea that it represents a datum perfectly intelligible through our most 
common intuition, as if it were a pure and simple feature of balance and 
moderation. In reality, in subiecta materia, “reasonableness” concept 
constitutes a rationality paradigm regarding a practical explanation, that is 
to say a logical pattern related to the issue of stating grounds as well as – and 
above all – to the intersubjective communication, control, and acceptability 
of these grounds during the proceedings. It is an argumentative rather 
than demonstrative (typical of the episteme) rationality that substantiates 
a justifying model aiming at making the reasons universal (rational 
acceptability)27.
In truth, the codification of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” 
evidentiary and judgment rule neither represents a useless frill, nor even 
an “Americanism”, but it constitutes an opportune (or at least clarifying) 
additional intervention with the aim of filling the vast “black hole”28 left in 
the code of procedure of 1988 (that is to say the incomplete formulation 
26 On the other hand, the new literal formulation of Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP, asso-
ciating the guilt decision to the fact that the accused is “found to be”, and not 
“deemed to be” guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, clearly alludes to the 
objective level of reasonableness of the responsibility analysis, rather than to 
the more or less relevant subjective levels of the deemed validity of the alle-
gation (see F. Caprioli, L’accertamento della responsabilità penale “oltre ogni 
ragionevole dubbio”, Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2009, p. 65).
27 On the merits, see STELLA, Federico. Giustizia e modernità. La protezione 
dell’innocente e la tutela delle vittime, III ed., Milano: Giuffrè, 2003, p. 169; 
MARZADURI, Enrico. Il mutamento delle scienze processualistiche. L’unità 
del sapere penalprocessualistico. In: GAROFOLI, Vincenzo (ed.). L’unità del 
sapere giuridico tra diritto penale e processo, Atti del Convegno. Bari, 21-22 
maggio 2004. Milano: Giuffrè, 2005, p. 88, and TARUFFO, Michele. La prova 
dei fatti giuridici. Nozioni generali. Milano: Giuffrè, 1992, p. 368. 
28 See STELLA, Federico, op. cit., p. 141. 
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of Art. 530, ph. 2, CCP), an intervention that determines ope legis a 
general criterion of discernment – objective (i.e. existing per se as it is 
not bound to the mere subjective perception) and preceptive (i.e. not 
left to the good conscience of each Judge) – to identify an insufficient 
or contradictory probatory outcome.
Therefore, it appears that it is not possible to endorse the eminent 
and evocative doctrinal theory that aims at reducing the significance of 
the coded formula to a purely connotative-didactic value, as if it were a 
simple invitation from the legislator to urge upon the Judge caution and 
severity in evaluating: a sort of standard of caution, an ethical principle 
with a benefic pedagogical effect, as a strong reference to the need for 
the conviction to be the result of a prudent and circumspect examination 
of evidence29. It is easy to object that by simply shaping the “beyond 
any reasonable doubt” rule as a principle falling outside of the legal 
framework – on the basis of which the trier of fact can convict someone 
only if sure about the defendant’s guilt – the issue of having an objective 
standard to assess the evidence is moved to an essentially subjective 
dimension, in light of the fact that the caution addressing the Judge’s 
ethical behavior concerns his personal belief, and appears to refer to 
the individual and irrational intime conviction of the French, rather than 
a rational assessment of evidence30.
The reference, in first instance, to the assessment of a criminal 
liability “beyond any reasonable doubt” certainly removes all juridical 
value in the criminal judgment from the purely skeptic doubt, that is 
that doubt lacking any specific motive referred to what we have reason 
to think in given circumstances31. 
Secondly, the BARD legal formula is needed to reiterate the 
essentially “probabilistic” nature of the guilty judgment, given that the 
29 See FERRUA, Paolo. La colpevolezza oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio, op. cit., 
p. 141. In this sense, see also DANIELE, Marcello. Una prima applicazione 
giurisprudenziale della regola dell’al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio. Rivista 
di diritto processuale, 2007, p. 254. 
30 See TARUFFO, Michele. Fatto, prova e verità (alla luce del principio dell’oltre 
ogni ragionevole dubbio). Criminalia, 2009, p. 310.
31 See MARCONI, Diego. Per la verità. Relativismo e filosofia. Torino: Einau-
di, 2007, p. 25. 
1241
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 2, p. 1227-1260, mai.-ago. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i2.577 |
evidentiary reasoning generates conclusions providing information that 
is not necessarily wholly included in the preambles. For these reasons, on 
the judgment of guilt it is never possible to confer complete certainty, but a 
more or less substantial probability degree32. Naturally, such “probability” 
is not merely quantitative, but it is a logical relationship between available 
evidence and the allegations to be verified. 
Nevertheless, there is a quid pluris in the legislative formula 
coded in 2006: the introduction in the Italian criminal trial system of 
the “beyond any reasonable doubt” judgment rule does not call for a 
static (quite obvious and politically correct) evidentiary standard with 
reference to the gnoseological judicial ascertainment of guilt33. This 
rule codification, completing a multiannual legislative, academic and 
jurisprudential effort, aims at creating a legal method (but not a legalistic 
one) of juridical reasoning in the discriminating evaluation of proof and 
rational justification of the adopted decision. 
When experiencing the reality of the Italian criminal trial system, 
one must inspect the substantial nature of the “beyond any reasonable 
32 See FESTA, Roberto. Induzione, probabilità e verisimilitudine. In: GIOREL-
LO, Giulio (ed.). Introduzione alla filosofia della scienza, II ed., Milano: 
R.C.S., 1999, p. 285.
33 On the merits, KOSTORIS, Roberto E., item “Giudizio” (diritto processuale pe-
nale), loc. cit., p. 13, points out that it is impossible to define in the abstract 
the exact threshold according to which the evidence must be considerate as 
sufficient to justify a statement of guilt. Furthermore, in legal literature there 
is the belief that Art. 533, CCP establishes the qualitative standard required 
as proof of the defendant’s criminal liability, i.e. the threshold of certitude to 
which the evidence obtained during the proceedings must aim for in order 
to render a conviction (see DELLA MONICA, Giuseppe. Il principio del libero 
convincimento. In: CATALANO, Elena Maria; CURTOTTI NAPPI, Donatella; 
DELLA MONICA, Giuseppe; LORUSSO, Sergio; MONTAGNA, Mariangela; 
PROCACCINO, Angela. Prova penale e metodo scientifico. Torino: Utet, 2009, 
p. 211; in the same vein, FERRUA, Paolo. Giusto processo: l’attuazione si 
misura con le incertezze della giurisdizione. Diritto e giustizia, 2001, 26, p. 
31; LORUSSO, Sergio. La prova scientifica. In: GAITO, Alfredo (directed by), 
La prova penale, vol. I, Torino: Utet, 2008, p. 341). Nevertheless, on a closer 
inspection, if the “reasonable doubt” is basically intended as a standard to 
overcome for the defendant’s conviction, the attention is brought on the an 
of the rational acceptability of the decision, whereas the dynamic aspect of 
the quomodo of such overcoming during the evaluative and decisional phase 
of the proceedings remains overshadowed.
1242 | CAllARi, Francesco.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 2, p. 1227-1260, mai.-ago. 2021. 
doubt”, that is to say its objective projection and the operative schemes 
that can help the judicial implementation of this rule34. This is the only 
way to bring out the mainly dynamic nature of the functional interaction 
between the evidentiary and judgment rule under discussion and the inner 
conviction of the Judge, considering, in prospect, the subsequent activity 
of logically and juridically supporting it in the grounds of the judgment35. 
3. “bEyond any rEasonablE doubt” as EvidEntiary and JudiCial 
rulE in thE italian Criminal trial.
Even before the codification of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” 
criterion, it is possible to observe how the most mindful Italian case-law 
never backed out from the intellectual effort to formalize the modus 
operandi of this rule. Nonetheless, this case-law has taken good care of 
avoiding getting stuck in abstract schemes or sterile algorithms, and never 
rested upon the illusion of magic or miraculous formulae. The attention 
on the effort to provide a concrete meaning to the “reasonable doubt” 
concept focused on the field of the scientific evidence, which has always 
brought about cognitive problems that tend to overcome the common 
experience, and that request more solid grounds for the guilty decision. 
Many Supreme Court decisions (such as the “Franzese” case) did 
not limit themselves to apodictically stating that insufficient, contradictory 
or uncertain evidence – that is to say the disclosure of the “reasonable 
doubt” – entails the neutralization of the charges and the consequent 
acquittal, but rather tried to elucidate the evidential reasoning that 
must lead to the guilty verdict. After having differentiated the statistical 
34 In this sense, PAULESU, Pier Paolo. La presunzione di non colpevolezza dell’im-
putato, II ed., Torino: Giappichelli, 2009, p. 192, stressed that the already 
made codification of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” judgment rule set 
forth in Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP does not solve, but rather raises a problem 
on the decision about an uncertain fact that can find today, as in the past, 
an adequate solution only in terms of interpretation; as a consequence, he 
hoped for the determination of some conceptual coordinates that can be 
“reasonably” shared. 
35 See FERRUA, Paolo. La colpevolezza oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio, op. cit., 
p. 145. 
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probability (relevant to the «empiric verification of the frequency 
regarding the sequence of events») from the logical probability (that 
«by following the inductive advancement of the evidential reasoning 
to establish the degree of confirmation of the alleged hypothesis on a 
specific circumstance to be proven, it includes the additional verification, 
on the grounds of the whole available evidence, […] of the persuasive 
and rational credibility of the judicial ascertainment»), this decision 
has highlighted how, within criminal proceedings, the logical method 
must lead to a conclusion showing a “high degree of rational credibility”, 
hence to the “trial certainty”» so that «the interference of different 
developments is avoided»36. 
Recently, Judges of the Supreme Court have specified in some 
judgements that, pursuant to the new statement of Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP, 
it is mandatory to pass a conviction when the obtained evidence leaves 
out only the remote possibility that, even if expressible in abstract and 
imaginable as possible in rerum natura, does not find the slightest validation 
when compared to trial findings, thus standing outside the natural order 
of things and of the normal human rationality37.
Certainly, these well-structured propositions cannot sum up 
the whole systemic operating process of the “beyond any reasonable 
doubt” criterion. In any case, even if still undeniably perfectible, they 
have the unquestionable merit of focusing on a distinctive connotation 
36 Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, July 10, 2002, Franzese, in Cassazione 
Penale, 2002, p. 3643 (trans. vers.).
37 See Court of Cassation, I Division, May 21, 2008, Franzoni, in Cassazione pe-
nale, 2009, p. 1840; Court of Cassation, I Division, May 26, 2010, Erardi, in Di-
ritto penale e processo, 2011, p. 23; Court of Cassation, II Division, December 
19, 2014, Segura, in Electronic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, 
No. 262280; Court of Cassation, IV Division, February 19, 2016, in Guida al 
diritto, 2006 (29), p. 62; Court of Cassation, I Division, April 12, 2016, in Elec-
tronic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 266941; Court of 
Cassation, IV Division, May 3, 2016, in Diritto e giustizia, 2016; Court of Cassa-
tion, VI Division, December 6, 2016, S.M., in Diritto penale e processo, 2017, p. 
309; Court of Cassation, VI Division, January 17, 2017, in Giurisprudenza ital-
iana, 2018, p. 468; Court of Cassation, VI Division, February 14, 2017, Alba-
no, in Electronic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 270299; 
Court of Cassation, IV Division, June 19, 2018, Castelli, ib., No. 274358; Court 
of Cassation, V Division, November 12, 2018, Segreto, ib., No. 275299; Court 
of Cassation, I Division, November 18, 2020, S., ib., No. 280605.
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of this regulatory provision: the statement of criminal liability in terms of 
certainty does not exclude the presence of the most abstract and remote 
possibility or any verisimilitude whatsoever, but the serious possibility 
to advance any other reasonable solution. 
Furthermore, it is even more important to note that such 
statements attest how the “beyond any reasonable doubt” criterion does 
not represent the subjective measure of the Judge’s belief, but rather 
the objective condition of confirming the allegation on the basis of the 
available evidence, taken as basis for the guilty decision.
Therefore, by restating Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP, the legislator did 
not mean to enter the “forbidden garden” of the free conviction of the 
Judge, but only to overcome the traditional dichotomy between the legal 
evidence system and the intime conviction, in favor of a criminal justice 
administration that conciliates the free appraisal of the evidence with 
the rational predictability of the judgment38. Having coded the heuristic 
formula of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” means having adopted the 
argumentative vis of the doubt as a cognitive and communicable critical 
evaluation tool both of evidence and opposing allegations on the fact39.
In this respect, the “reasonableness” begins to be “the measure 
of all things”, whereas the criminal judgment – permanently ceasing to 
38 After all, the judgment rule expresses a “fundamental need for freedom”, 
tightly bounded to the rational nature of the modern trial (see PAULESU, Pier 
Paolo. La presunzione di non colpevolezza dell’imputato, loc. cit., p. 180), which 
does not allow to leave the procedural assessment of truth to a Judge’s discre-
tionary power of decision. Hence, the codification of the “reasonable doubt” 
criterion is necessary to avoid the contingency that the inner conviction is 
transformed from typical symbol of the adversary criminal trial (see NOBI-
LI, Massimo. Il principio del libero convincimento del giudice. Milano: Giuffrè, 
1974, p. 32) into a “crowbar in the Judge’s hands” (see CORDERO, Franco, 
op. cit., p. 588), which would be characterized by a substantial arbitrariness.
39 Accordingly, the Judges from the Court of Cassation have also recently asserted 
that the “beyond any reasonable doubt” rule, introduced by Law No. 46/2006, 
imposes to the Judge a dialectic way of verifying the allegation according to the 
“doubt” criterion, so as to avoid any inner (self-contradiction or explanatory 
incapability) or external (existence of an alternative hypothesis provided with 
rationality and practical plausibility) doubts (see Court of Cassation, I Divi-
sion, October 24, 2011, Javad, in Electronic Documentation Centre of the Court 
of Cassation, No. 251507; Court of Cassation, V Division, December 12, 2015, 
Stasi, in Diritto penale contemporaneo (web), June 29, 2016, p. 110).
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constitute the solipsism of the judicial body – fully becomes a dialectic 
dispute between the parties of the trial before an independent Judge (in 
medio cognoscens). In short, the criminal trial becomes an actus trium 
personarum [a proceedings before three different actors], in which, by 
means of a rigorous process of a falsifying epistemology, the allegation 
undergoes multiple and systematic rebuttal so as to thoroughly sift the 
logical coherence and the compatibility with the evidence. 
Through the rule of the “beyond any reasonable doubt”, as 
criterion for judicial assessment of evidence, the epistemological principle 
of the adversarial process permeates not only the evidential and reasoning 
procedure of the parties, but also the work of knowledge and rational 
explanation carried out by the Judge40. In truth, only by untangling all 
knots of the dialectic discussion developed during the course of the 
proceedings, both on antagonistic reconstructions and evidence, it is 
possible to have proper control on the possible alternative statement of 
facts capable of leading to the exclusion of a “reasonable doubt” margin 
on the guilt of the accused.
Finally, with one last notation, it is interesting to observe that in 
Italy the “beyond any reasonable doubt” criterion permeates the main 
lines of the criminal procedural system and gives salient expression to 
the cognitive status of justice in criminalibus, which gravitates around 
the fundamental principles of orality of trial and of immediacy in the 
formation of evidence. 
This emerges with particular reference to the overturning of the 
first-instance acquittal, especially with regard to the judicial evaluation of 
the declarative evidence41. In fact, the BARD criterion requires generally 
40 The epistemological principle of the adversarial system is translated in a tool 
to stimulate a thorough investigation on any advanced hypothesis, demand-
ing attention and openness of the judicial body toward the ascertainment 
of any alternative potentially undermining the original formulation of the 
Public Prosecutor (see GAITO, Alfredo. Il procedimento probatorio (tra vis-
chiosità della tradizione e prospettive europee). In: ID. (directed by) La prova 
penale, vol. I, loc. cit., p. 102). 
41 On the issue of the overturning on appeal, see COPPI, Franco. No all’appello 
del pm dopo la sentenza di assoluzione. Il giusto processo, 2003, p. 27 f.; PA-
DOVANI, Tullio. Il doppio grado di giurisdizione: appello dell’imputato, ap-
pello del P.M., principio del contraddittorio. Cassazione penale, 2003, p. 4023 
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that, in the absence of occurred elements, any pejorative review carried 
out on appeal must be supported by resolutive arguments, able to highlight 
objective inadequacies or insufficiencies of the acquittal decision42. In 
other words, in case of overturning on appeal, the first-instance acquittal 
of the accused must be no longer sustainable, even in the sense of leaving 
residual reasonable doubts open on the assertion of guilt. This means that 
a different judicial evaluation of equivalent plausibility, with respect to 
the assessment of the first judge, is not enough to overturn an acquittal; 
on the contrary, it is necessary, on the level of the rational justification 
of conviction, a “superior persuasive force”43, capable of bringing down 
any reasonable doubt.
However, in order to realize actually a “reinforced” motivation of 
the overturning that achieves and supports a decision of guilt “beyond a 
f.; SPANGHER, Giorgio. Sistema delle impugnazioni penali e durata ragion-
evole del processo. Corriere giuridico, 2002, 10, p. 1262 f.; STELLA, Federico. 
Sul divieto per il pubblico ministero di proporre appello contro le sentenze di 
assoluzione. Cassazione penale, 2004, p. 756 f.; LOZZI, Gilberto. Reformatio in 
peius del giudice di appello e cognitio facti ex actis della Corte di cassazione. 
Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2004, p. 641 f.; PISANI, Mario. 
Durata ragionevole del processo penale e appellabilità delle sentenze. Rivista 
di diritto processuale, 2006, p. 3 f.; TRANCHINA, Giovanni; DI CHIARA, Gi-
useppe, item “Appello” (diritto processuale penale), in Enciclopedia del diritto, 
Agg. III, Milano, 1999, p. 202 f.
42 In this sense, see Court of Cassation, VI Division, November 21, 2012, in 
Electronic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 253909; Court 
of Cassation, VI Division, January 24, 2013, ib., No. 254113; Court of Cassa-
tion, III Division, November 27, 2014, ib., No. 262524; Court of Cassation, 
II Division, April 9, 2015, ib., No. 263763; Court of Cassation, V Division, 
September 14, 2017, ib., No. 272082; Court of Cassation, IV Division, March 
14, 2017, ib., No. 269610; Court of Cassation, IV Division, January 18, 2018, 
ib., No. 272224. 
43 See Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, april 28, 2016, Dasgupta, in Electron-
ic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 267486. For an analysis 
of this decision, see AIUTI, Valerio. Poteri d’ufficio della Cassazione e diritto 
all’equo processo. Cassazione penale, 2016, p. 3214 f.; CAPONE, Arturo. Pro-
va in appello: un difficile bilanciamento. Processo penale e giustizia, 2016, p. 
52 f.; LORENZETTO, Elisa. Reformatio in peius in appello e processo equo 
(art. 6 Cedu): fisiologia e patologia secondo le Sezioni unite. Diritto penale 
contemporaneo (web), October 5, 2016; TESORIERO, Salvatore. Luci e ombre 
della rinnovazione dell’istruttoria dibattimentale in appello per il presunto 
innocente. Giustizia penale, 2017, III, c. 79 f.
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reasonable doubt”, it is not possible to do without orality and immediacy 
in the reassuming of the declarative evidence turned out to be decisive. 
Otherwise, the pars motiva of the judgement would be compromised by the 
logical aporia deriving from the fact that the overturning of acquittal, made 
on the basis of a mere paper valuation of the evidence available to the first 
judge, «contains in itself the implicit reasonable doubt determined by the 
adoption of conflicting decisions»44. In such cases, in direct consideration 
of the canons of “fair trial” in criminal proceedings – contained in Art. 111 
of the Italian Constitution, as well as in Art. 6 ECHR – the reasonable doubt 
about the accused’s guilt can be overcome only by using the “best” method 
for forming evidence. In this sense, in 2017 the Italian legislator (Law 
No. 103, June 23, 2017)45 – also for the primary purpose of incorporating 
44 Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, January 19, 2017, Patalano, in Electronic 
Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 269786 (trans. vers.). On 
this point, see, in particular, APRATI, Roberta, Overturning sfavorevole in ap-
pello e mancanza del riesame. Cassazione penale, 2017, p. 2672 f.; BELLUTA, 
Hervé; LUPÁRIA, Luca. Ragionevole dubbio e prima condanna in appello: 
solo la rinnovazione ci salverà? Diritto penale contemporaneo (web), May 8, 
2017; ROMBI, Natalia. Le Sezioni unite e le condanne cartolari nel giudizio 
abbreviato d’appello. Processo penale e giustizia, 2017, p. 806 f.
45 In this regard, see AIUTI, Valerio. Obbligo di rinnovazione e prova dichiarati-
va. In: MARANDOLA, Antonella; BENE, Teresa (ed.). La riforma della giusti-
zia penale. Modifiche al codice penale, al codice di procedura penale e all’ordina-
mento penitenziario (L.103/2017), Milano: Giuffré, 2017, p. 254 f.; BARGIS, 
Marta. Riforma in due fasi per la disciplina dell’appello penale. Diritto penale 
contemporaneo (web), June 13, 2018; BELLUTA, Hervé; LUPÁRIA, Luca. 
La rinnovazione dell’istruttoria dibattimentale fra legge e giurisprudenza: 
punti fermi… e non. Sistema penale (web), November 20, 2019; BRONZO, 
Pasquale. La nuova ipotesi di rinnovazione dell’istruzione dibattimentale in 
appello. In: BACCARI, Gian Marco; BONZANO, Carlo; LA REGINA, Katia; 
MANCUSO, Enrico Maria (ed.). Le recenti riforme in materia penale, Milano: 
Cedam, 2017, p. 413 f.; CAPRARO, Laura. Novità per l’appello: concordato 
sui motivi e obbligo di rinnovazione istruttoria. In: SCALFATI, Adolfo (ed.). 
La riforma della giustizia penale. Commento alla legge 23 giugno 2017, n. 103, 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2017, p. 211 f.; CAPONE. Arturo. Appello del pubblico 
ministero e rinnovazione istruttoria. In: BARGIS, Marta; BELLUTA, Hervé. 
La riforma delle impugnazioni tra carenze sistematiche e incertezze applicative 
(Commento alla legge 23 giugno 2017, n. 103 e al d.lgs. 6 febbraio 2018, n. 11), 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2018, p. 53 f.; MARANDOLA, Antonella. Prime rifles-
sioni sul “nuovo” giudizio d’appello, Diritto penale contemporaneo, 2018, 2, p. 
169 f.; MONTAGNA, Mariangela. La rinnovazione obbligatoria della prova in 
appello: problematiche applicative. Processo penale e giustizia, 2018, p. 1151 
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in the normative provisions the indications emerged in the Strasbourg 
Court’s case-law46 – has established that the judge provides the renewal 
of the trial evidentiary hearing, in the event of an appeal by the Public 
Prosecutor against an acquittal for reasons regarding the assessment of 
the declarative evidence (Art. 603, ph. 3-bis, CCP)47.
Therefore, even in this juridical dimension, the BARD formula 
results as a “very general criterion” of the criminal procedural system48, 
which constitutes, through a specific ontological and operative connotation, 
the “eye” through which to pass whenever a decision has to be made49.
f.; SPANGHER, Giorgio. Il ‘‘nuovo’’ giudizio di appello. Diritto penale e pro-
cesso, 2018, p. 1329; SURACI, Leonardo. La rinnovazione del dibattimento in 
caso di proscioglimento. In: SPANGHER, Giorgio (ed.), La riforma Orlando. 
Modifiche al Codice penale, Codice di procedura penale e Ordinamento peniten-
ziario, Pisa: Pacini, 2017, p. 262 f. 
46 European Court of Human Rights, October 5, 2011, Dan v. Moldova, § 33; 
European Court of Human Rights, July 5, 2016, Lazu v. Moldova, § 40; Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, February 28, 2017, Manoli v. Moldova, § 32-33; 
European Court of Human Rights, June 29, 2017, Lorefice v. Italy, § 45. In this 
regard, more recently, see European Court of Human Rights, November 10, 
2020, Dan v. Moldova, (No. 2), § 47; European Court of Human Rights, Octo-
ber 22, 2020, Tondo v. Italy, § 38; European Court of Human Rights, March 25, 
2021, Di Martino e Molinari v. Italy, § 28.
47 On this point, in particular, see Court of Cassation, IV Division, January 
26, 2021, in Electronic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 
281049; Court of Cassation, II Division, February 21, 2010, ib., No. 279146; 
Court of Cassation, V Division, June 18, 2018, ib., No. 274593. Moreover, 
de iure condendo, the Study Commission for the reform of the justice system, 
chaired by Giorgio Lattanzi, has recently proposed to abolish the appeal of 
the Public Prosecutor. This legislative proposal derives, with regard to the ac-
quittal decisions, «from the standard of beyond any reasonable doubt, which 
[…] makes it logically inconceivable that the procedural certainty could be 
achieved after an absolution, except in the presence of vices of motivation 
that exclude the possibility of re-proposing the alternative assessment, and 
as a result of a complex and problematic renewal inquiry» (Final Report of the 
Study Commission, May 24, 2021 - trans. vers.).
48 See Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, January 19, 2017, Patalano, in Elec-
tronic Documentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 269786. 
49 See BELLUTA, Hervé; LUPÁRIA, Luca. La parabola ascendente dell’istrutto-
ria in appello nell’esegesi “formante” delle Sezioni Unite. Diritto penale con-
temporaneo, 3, 2017, p. 156.
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4. ConClusion.
In Italy, the BARD criterion pervades the fundamental structure 
of the criminal procedural system and gives significant expression to some 
of the principal guarantees in causis criminalibus: the presumption of 
innocence of the accused, the burden of evidence placed on the prosecution 
and the decision formula in dubio pro reo, as well as the obligation of 
rational justification of judgements.
Without meaning to build any abstruse heuristic paradigms, 
naively aiming at assimilating the quomodo of the trial knowledge to 
the methodological rigor of natural sciences, it is possible to state 
that the “beyond any reasonable doubt” criterion prevents the Judge 
from rendering a conviction every time that there is space left for 
incertitude that rests upon the inadequacy of the accusation (when 
the inculpating evidence does not cover all the elements constituting 
the criminal offence or, in any case, is invalidated by counterproofs of 
the same demonstrating attitude) or on the existence of an alternative 
hypothesis – corroborated by solid evidence – that was not neutralized 
on its explanatory significance. 
It is not sufficient that the allegation is simply proven to be more 
probable, plausible, or preferable if compared to the defense position, 
just because it is more conform to the facts relevant to assert the guilt. 
The decision convicting the defendant is denied when the allegation 
simply prevails – regardless of its margin of advantage – in light of 
the fact that it must categorically impose itself on any other probable 
factual hypothesis reconstruction, as if it had some sort of uncontested 
logical supremacy on the antagonistic reconstructions regarding the 
circumstances sub iudice50. In this manner, the burden of proof lying 
50 In this sense, the Judges of the Supreme Court uphold that the rule of the be-
yond any reasonable doubt permanently puts a strain on that jurisprudential 
orientation according to which, when facing more than one thesis in recon-
structing the facts, a Judge could embrace one among them only because he 
deemed it to be the most probable one. This will not be allowed anymore 
because, in order to reach a conviction, a Judge must consider the recon-
struction of the fact leading to the acquittal of the defendant as improbable, 
but must also believe that this alternative hypothesis is unreasonable (the 
hypothesis must be unreliable or lacking any corroboration) (see Court of 
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with the Public Prosecutor is added to the need to rebut the opposing 
explanations, even if not provided with sound evidence51. On the other 
hand, the burden of proof lying with the defense must only highlight the 
existence of plausible alternatives to the one – even if proven – of the 
prosecutor, in order to raise a “reasonable doubt” that the facts could 
have occurred in a different way52. Should this be the case, the rational 
existence of an exclusive and univocal certainty on the allegation would 
be therefore undermined53.
To conclude, the Italian legislator, with the normative interpolation 
of 2006, intended to include unequivocally and solemnly in the criminal 
procedure code the BARD rule, arisen and developed in the heart of 
the Anglo-American legal experience. However, in Italy both legal 
literature and jurisprudence had to manage a complex route of normative 
Cassation, IV Division, November 12, 2009, Durante, in Electronic Documen-
tation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 245879; Court of Cassation, V 
Division, February 19, 2014, ib., No. 260409).
51 For that matter, the doubt goes in favor of the accused even when the burden 
of proof lies with him, that is to say when he has to convince the Judge of 
the existence of a favorable fact. In truth, pursuant to Art. 530, ph. 3, CCP, 
«if there is proof that the fact is committed under a cause of justification, a 
personal reason of non-liability, or when there is a doubt on the existence 
of both these circumstances, the Judge pronounces an acquittal». See VAR-
RASO, Gianluca. Ragionevole dubbio e prova delle esimenti. In: INCAMPO, 
Antonio; SCALFATI, Adolfo (ed.). Giudizio penale e ragionevole dubbio, loc. 
cit., p. 339 f.
52 See Court of Cassation, VI Division, December 5, 2018, in Electronic Docu-
mentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 275290; Court of Cassation, VI 
Division, November 12, 2019, ib., No. 277682.
53 In an interesting decision, the Court of Cassation stated that the “reasonable 
doubt” must be grounded on matters of fact allowing an alternative reading 
of the value as evidence of the same elements used for the reconstructions, 
taking away from the opposing interpretation the persuasive univocality (see 
Court of Cassation, VI Division, April 4, 2013, No. 19749). On the other 
hand, in a more recent judgment, the Judges of the Court of Cassation reas-
serted how the conviction “beyond any reasonable doubt” entails that, should 
an alternative reconstruction of facts be proposed, the elements confirming 
the accepted reconstruction hypothesis have to be identified, so as to show 
the un-rationality of the doubt deriving from the same opposing hypothesis 
(see Court of Cassation, II Division, December 10, 2013, in Electronic Doc-
umentation Centre of the Court of Cassation, No. 1405; Court of Cassation, V 
Division, February 21, 2014, ib., No. 16397).
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implementation. They could not benefit sic et simpliciter from the precious 
and stratified heritage of common law experience, but had to deal with the 
particular juridical reality of a civil law system, in which specific emphasis 
is given to the procedural guarantee of the control over the evaluative, 
logical and argumentative process carried out by the judge and resulting 
from the decision’s motivation. In this regard, the legislative acceptance 
of the BARD criterion in the Italian adversary criminal trial – far from 
being reduced only to a more rigorous assessment of evidence – has 
resulted in a legal method of evidentiary reasoning, through which to 
discern between the antagonistic hypotheses of innocence and guilt. In 
particular, the modification to Art. 533, ph. 1, CCP represents the formal 
and genuine recognition of a specific legal method which elevates the 
dialectic strength of reasonable doubt as an instrument for evaluating 
evidence and assumptions about facts in the finalistic perspective of the 
judgment motivation.
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